Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules

Description

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

'All in all the book is a true tour de force; it is one of the deepest and best-argued game-theoretical treatises I have ever read.' Wlodek Rabinowicz, University of Uppsala