Norway 1940: The Luftwaffe's Scandinavian Blitzkrieg

Description

The German invasion of Norway was a pivotal moment in modern warfare, the first joint campaign that featured air power as an equal element of all operations. It was, in fact, the superior use of their air force that gave the Germans the decisive margin of victory and ensured the failure of the Allied counter-offensive in central Norway in April and May 1940. All aspects of air power were employed in Norway, from long-range bombing and reconnaissance to air transport, with the Luftwaffe's ability to transport large numbers of troops and supply ground forces over great distances being particularly important. Norway was the first campaign in history in which key targets were seized by airborne forces, and the first in which air superiority was able to overcome the overwhelming naval superiority of an enemy. Researched from primary sources, this engaging history by air power expert Dr James Corum skilfully draws out where and why air power made the difference in Norway, and analyses the campaign's influence on the coming months and years of World War II.

Dr James Corum is a retired US Army Reserve lieutenant colonel. He taught military history at Salford University, UK, from 2014 to 2019, and was dean of the Baltic Defence College from 2009 to 2014. From 1991 to 2004, he served as a professor at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Power Studies. From 2005 to 2008 he was an associate professor at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Dr Corum is the author of several books on military history, including The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (1992); The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (1997); Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen, Master of the German Air War (2008); The Luftwaffe's Way of War: German Air Doctrine,1911-1945, with Richard Muller (1998); Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, with Wray Johnson (2003); Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy (2007); and Bad Strategies: How Major Powers Fail in Counterinsurgency (2008).