Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind

Description

The past decade has witnessed an exciting (and controversial) new approach to philosophy: Experimental philosophers aim to supplement, and perhaps to supplant, traditional philosophical approaches by employing empirical methods from the social sciences. In Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind, leading experimental philosophers apply these methods to questions about the nature of the mind, the self, consciousness, moral judgment, and concepts. By bringing empirical methods to bear on key issues, Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind pushes the debates forward, casting new insight on perennial problems. This is an essential resource for professors, graduate students, and advanced undergraduates interested in either philosophy of mind or the burgeoning field of experimental philosophy.

Justin Sytsma is a Lecturer in Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand

An illuminating modern guide to profound puzzles of mind, required reading for both philosophers and psychologists. -- Kurt Gray, Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of North Carolina, USA A cutting-edge collection, including a broad range of new work by some of the leading contributors to the field. -- Eric Schwitzgebel, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, USA This is a terrific collection of cutting edge papers by some of the best and most creative young people in the field! -- Stephen Stich, Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy & Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, USA Justin Sytsma has assembled a useful snapshot of the current state of experimental philosophy of mind. Each article builds on a substantial body of previous work in psychology, experimental philosophy, and traditional philosophy. Because of this, the chapters deliver compelling contributions to the literature on mental state attributions, moral judgments, personal identity, and concepts. -- Kaija Mortensen, Randolph College * Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *