The Epistemic Lightness of Truth: Deflationism and its Logic

Description

This book analyses and defends the deflationist claim that there is nothing deep about our notion of truth. According to this view, truth is a 'light' and innocent concept, devoid of any essence which could be revealed by scientific inquiry. Cezary Cieslinski considers this claim in light of recent formal results on axiomatic truth theories, which are crucial for understanding and evaluating the philosophical thesis of the innocence of truth. Providing an up-to-date discussion and original perspectives on this central and controversial issue, his book will be important for those with a background in logic who are interested in formal truth theories and in current philosophical debates about the deflationary conception of truth.

Cezary Cieslinski is a member of the Institute of Philosophy at Uniwersytet Warszawski, Poland. His research, which focuses on truth theories, logic and philosophy of language, has been published in journals including Mind and the Journal of Philosophical Logic.

'I cannot praise this book too highly. I predict that it will constitute indispensable reading for any researcher in the field (professional or postgraduate) for years to come. Many open problems are listed: many of them would constitute excellent subjects of a Ph.D. dissertation in philosophical logic; others set a research agenda that will keep a significant part of the next generation of researchers on axiomatic truth occupied.' Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews