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The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Paperback / softback

Main Details

Title The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Authors and Contributors      By (author) Hanne Andersen
By (author) Peter Barker
By (author) Xiang Chen
Physical Properties
Format:Paperback / softback
Pages:220
Dimensions(mm): Height 229,Width 152
Category/GenrePhilosophy of science
History of science
ISBN/Barcode 9781107637238
ClassificationsDewey:509.04
Audience
Professional & Vocational

Publishing Details

Publisher Cambridge University Press
Imprint Cambridge University Press
Publication Date 26 September 2013
Publication Country United Kingdom

Description

Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions became the most widely read book about science in the twentieth century. His terms 'paradigm' and 'scientific revolution' entered everyday speech, but they remain controversial. In the second half of the twentieth century, the new field of cognitive science combined empirical psychology, computer science, and neuroscience. In this book, the theories of concepts developed by cognitive scientists are used to evaluate and extend Kuhn's most influential ideas. Based on case studies of the Copernican revolution, the discovery of nuclear fission, and an elaboration of Kuhn's famous 'ducks and geese' example of concept learning, this volume, first published in 2006, offers accounts of the nature of normal and revolutionary science, the function of anomalies, and the nature of incommensurability.

Author Biography

Peter Barker is Professor of History of Science at the University of Oklahoma. Hanne Andersen is Professor of Medical Philosophy and Clinical Theory at the University of Copenhagen. Xiang Chen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at California Lutheran University.

Reviews

'... the authors do offer powerful illustrations of why consideration of concepts and conceptual change must be an integral part of any convincing history of science, just as they urge against some competing views.' British Journal for the History of Science