States of Consciousness: The Pulses of Experience

Description

States of Consciousness extends Thomas Natsoulas' development of the psychology of consciousness by giving sustained attention to the stream of consciousness and its component 'pulses of experience'. Natsoulas' unrivalled scholarship across psychology, philosophy and cognate fields means that very often surprising connections are made between the works of leading theorists of consciousness, including Brentano, Mead, Bergmann, Strawson, James, Freud, Skinner, Hebb, Gibson, O'Shaughnessy and Woodruff Smith. At a time when interest in consciousness and the brain is growing rapidly, this book provides an in-depth analysis of sophisticated psychological accounts that pertain to consciousness. Its breadth of coverage and interdisciplinary nature will be of interest to postgraduates and specialists in a range of fields, particularly the history of psychology and philosophy of mind.

Thomas Natsoulas is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Davis, and a fellow of the Association for Psychological Science and the American Psychological Association. He is the author of Consciousness and Perceptual Experience (Cambridge, 2013) and The Conceptual Representation of Consciousness (Cambridge, 2015).

'With his characteristic scholarship, Natsoulas presents an extraordinarily scholarly analysis of historical and more recent responses to William James's 'stream of consciousness', the successive states. This analysis begins with the contrast of Brentano's conscious representation and Bergman's logical positivism. We see diminished significance accorded consciousness from the Freudian unconscious to Skinner's radical behaviorism - then analyses of conscious states from Gibson onward. It is all significant for the current literature.' Donelson E. Dulany, University of Illinois 'Thomas Natsoulas has written widely on consciousness with a psychologist's eye to philosophical themes. In States of Consciousness Natsoulas offers a running dialogue with historically significant thinkers. He debates subtle features of inner awareness with Franz Brentano, William James, Sigmund Freud, B. F. Skinner, Gustav Bergmann, J. J. Gibson, Brian O'Shaughnessy, and Galen Strawson. The give-and-take is equally instructive to the psychologist, phenomenologist, philosopher of mind, and cognitive neuroscientist. Interacting with each of these research perspectives, Natsoulas shows in effect how Brentano's conception of inner consciousness remains absolutely crucial to our understanding of human consciousness, even as its exact character is in debate.' David Woodruff Smith, University of California, Irvine