The Politics of Judicial Independence in the UK's Changing Constitution

Description

Judicial independence is generally understood as requiring that judges must be insulated from political life. The central claim of this work is that far from standing apart from the political realm, judicial independence is a product of it. It is defined and protected through interactions between judges and politicians. In short, judicial independence is a political achievement. This is the main conclusion of a three-year research project on the major changes introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and the consequences for judicial independence and accountability. The authors interviewed over 150 judges, politicians, civil servants and practitioners to understand the day-to-day processes of negotiation and interaction between politicians and judges. They conclude that the greatest threat to judicial independence in future may lie not from politicians actively seeking to undermine the courts, but rather from their increasing disengagement from the justice system and the judiciary.

Graham Gee is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Birmingham. Robert Hazell is Professor of Government and the Constitution and Director of the Constitution Unit at University College London. Kate Malleson is Professor of Law at Queen Mary, University of London. Patrick O'Brien is a Fellow in Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

'The book is perhaps most refreshing when adopting its 'political lens' method. It is a subject that frequently might be examined in an overly legalistic manner. Their 'political lens' encourages the authors to locate politics, politicians, and political processes at the heart of the study of independence and accountability, and not merely by examining the discourses of judges. In so doing, independence and accountability are viewed as political achievements.' Jim McConalogue, The Journal of Politics