The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective

Description

The wars since 9/11, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, have generated frustration and an increasing sense of failure in the West. Much of the blame has been attributed to poor strategy. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, public enquiries and defence think tanks have detected a lack of consistent direction, of effective communication, and of governmental coordination. In this important book, Sir Hew Strachan, one of the world's leading military historians, reveals how these failures resulted from a fundamental misreading and misapplication of strategy itself. He argues that the wars since 2001 have not in reality been as 'new' as has been widely assumed and that we need to adopt a more historical approach to contemporary strategy in order to identify what is really changing in how we wage war. If war is to fulfil the aims of policy, then we need first to understand war.

Hew Strachan is Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of All Souls College. Between 2004 and 2012 he was the Director of the Oxford Programme on the Changing Character of War. He also serves on the Strategic Advisory Panel of the Chief of the Defence Staff, on the UK Defence Academy Advisory Board, and on the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Foreign Policy listed him as one of the most influential global thinkers for 2012 and he was knighted in the New Year's Honours for 2013. His books include the first volume of his projected three-volume work The First World War (2001), which was awarded two American military history prizes and nominated for the Glenfiddich Scottish book of the year; The First World War: A New Illustrated History (2003), published to accompany a ten-part television series for Channel 4 and nominated for a British Book Award; and Carl von Clausewitz's On War (2007). His recent edited volumes include The Changing Character of War (2011) and How Fighting Ends (2012).

'A very thoughtful, enormously stimulating, and hugely thought-provoking examination of the strategies, concepts, and civil-military relationships that have influenced the character of war in the twenty-first century.' General David H. Petraeus, former Commander of United States Central Command and Commanding General of the Multi-National Force - Iraq and the NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan 'Another masterpiece from the foremost military academic of our generation. If you want to understand strategy, just read this book!' General Sir David Richards GCB CBE DSO, former Chief of Defence Staff 'Unparalleled in historic depth of argument, a surprising yet seductive view on whether modern war should bend to the demands of politics, or politics to the needs of war.' Jan Willem Honig, King's College London 'Strachan's historical analyses are a valuable addition to the literature on strategy. He invites the reader to think carefully about what we think we know and understand about strategy, and, perhaps more significantly, why we understand and think about strategy the way we do today.' Terry Terriff, University of Calgary 'A valuable book tracing an esteemed scholar's contributions to contemporary strategic thinking.' Antulio Echevarria, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College '[A] powerful and stimulating essay about the conduct of war and peace in our time. It is an essential read for MPs and hacks, the ideal primer for the debate about why we need armed force, and in what form, today.' London Evening Standard 'Impressive and provocative.' Daily Telegraph '... a timely and devastating critique.' Richard Norton-Taylor, The Guardian online '... extremely well written ...' Jerry Lenaburg, New York Journal of Books '[Strachan's] insistence on Clausewitzian exactitude produces a uniquely incisive assessment of key moments in America's twenty-first-century wars that may be particularly valuable to American leadership as it leaves them behind.' Foreign Policy's 'The Best Defense' blog '... offers much good sense.' Lawrence D. Freedman, Foreign Affairs