Churchill, Chamberlain and Appeasement

Description

Was Churchill correct when he claimed the Second World War could easily have been prevented if Chamberlain had not appeased Hitler? How far did Churchill and Chamberlain differ on defence and foreign policy? To what extent was Chamberlain responsible for military defeats in 1940? In this new account of appeasement, G. C. Peden addresses these questions and provides a comparative analysis of Chamberlain and Churchill's views on foreign policy and strategic priorities, explores what deterrence and appeasement meant in the military, economic and political context of the 1930s and where Chamberlain and Churchill agreed and disagreed on how best to deter Germany. Beginning in 1931 when Chamberlain became Chancellor of the Exchequer, this book explores the evolution of British policy towards Germany through to the Munich Agreement and its aftermath within the context of Britain's power to influence international affairs in the 1930s and of contemporary intelligence.

G. C. Peden is Emeritus Professor of Stirling University. His previous publications include Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (2007), The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906-1959 (2000) and British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939 (1979). He is a Fellow of Scotland's national academy, the Royal Society of Edinburgh.

'A masterly analysis that takes a fresh approach to appeasement, based on the author's expert knowledge and understanding of both policies and personalities.' Gill Bennett, Former FCO Chief Historian 'A rigorous and compelling new look at one of the most important episodes in twentieth-century British and European History.' Richard Toye, University of Exeter